Wars, Guns, and Votes: Democracy in Dangerous Places
by Paul Collier.
Coolier's book quantitatively examines the serious problems of power
and endless political violence in the nations
of the "bottom billion" (low-income countries that are caught in one
of four development traps, such as Afghanistan and Zimbabwe).
Instead of making knee-jerk assumptions, he tries to quantitatively
analyze a whole host of political questions, and the results are intriguing.
A few samplers should give an idea.
In chapter 1, he shows that in countries where the annual per capita
income is $2700 or greater, a democracy tends to less political violence
than an autocracy.
But where the per capita income is less, democracies
(defined merely as "had an election") tend to have more
violence, for a variety of reasons.
Personally, I think his definition of "democracy" is too weak
(it does not include "rule of law" or
"protection of the rights of minorities") but I see his point.
It also shows why, for many of these leaders, miscounting the vote
(often combined with other dirty tricks) is so tempting.
In chapter 3 he examines ethnic politics.
Discussions on policy choices get crowded out by identity politics,
and identity politics also leads to polarized results.
Many studies have found that ethnic diversity causes systemically worse
public services (it's causal, not just correlated).
The basic problem is that people are more willing to trust people from their
own ethnic group, and trust is necessary for public services.
Interestingly, diversity causes an advantage in private economic
activity in higher-income nations;
diversity raises team productivity (presumably
because of its increase in the range of skills, perspectives, and so on).
On page 60, he makes an intriguing claim:
"This is clearly consistent with the contrast between America and Europe;
the as yet more homogenous societies of Europe
have a larger public sector".
Unfortunately, the "beneficial effects of diversity only set in at
higher levels of income".
His analysis of civil war (in chapter 5)
is interesting; rather than focusing on the causes,
he presumes that there will always be someone in a country that
has a grievance, and then primarily focuses on how prone
that country is to having a civil war based on its circumstances.
A country is at a greater risk for civil war if it is
poor with a low growth rate, unsurprisingly.
Another risk is being dependent on natural resources
(e.g., Angola diamonds); they provide a ready source of rebel financing,
provide something to fight over, and enable the government to function
without taxing citizen income (gradually detaching the government from
what citizens want).
Ethnic diversity, religious diversity, a large proportion of men
aged 15-25, and a history with previous civil wars all increase the risk
of civil war.
The presence of forests didn't matter, but the presence of mountains did:
Mountains greatly increased the risk of civil war
(as they provide ready-made hideouts for rebels).
Surprisingly, its colonial experience tends to have little to do with the
risk of civil war.
"Conventionally, the governments of the bottom billion are
regarded as internationally powerless... they see themselves as still
entrapped by the bullying of more powerful nations.
I think that this victim-bully imagery has been hugely disfunctional.
It has masked a radically different reality: individually, the governments
of the bottom billion have too much sovereignty, not too little...
they have seldom formed forged strong national identities to compete
with their ancient social identifiers of ethnicity and religion.
As a result, thought too small for security, they are
too large for the social cohesion that is hugely helpful for the
provision of public goods." (page 198-199).
He thne makes a very controverial claim
that the emphasis on "national sovereignty" is often
a smokescreen in these countries:
"the most enduring legacy of the colonial experience is the
excessive respect given... to the notion of national sovereignty.
In reality, the typical society of the bottom billion does not have national
sovereignty. It has yet to become a nation
as opposed to a state: so it lacks the cohesion needed to produce effective
restraints upon either the the conduct of the electrions or the
subsequent power of the winner.
As a result, it [merely] has presidential sovereignty.
No wonder presidents are jealous of national sovereignty: they are
jealous of their own power." (page 200).
Perhaps most interesting, but most controversial, is where he tries to
use these analysis to prescribe solutions.
These nations are often too small to provide many services, but
merging or effective multinational cooperation are
simply impractical in most cases for them.
His "proposal 1" (page 202) would be for providing a "powerful carrot"
for such governments that sign up for a voluntary international standard
for fair elections, and that "powerful carrot" would for the international
community to commit itself to reinstate (by force) that elected government
should a coup d'etat occur.
I think this would have to be done case-by-case, where done.
While it's all well and good to say "rich countries should help poor ones",
that's the same as saying "your children should die for foreigners
without benefit to your country", and that is correctly a harder argument.
Also, I think there would need to be other conditions; at the very least,
the "opposition" party members would need to be guaranteed safe
(else the "winners" are likely to kill off their opposition, a sad and
repetitive tale).
He has two other proposals:
"Enforcing probity in public spending"
(ensuring that money is well spent) and
"international supply of security".
Earlier in the book, he also notes approvingly of something else that works:
Building a sense of national identity.
On page 66-68, he discusses Indonesia and Tanzania, where they focused on
standardizing on one national language, inserted pan-country history
into school curricula, hammered home the
rhetoric of national identity, forbid ethnic platforms, and so on.
This is a sequel to his book The Bottom Billion.
I haven't read Bottom Billion yet, but it's definitely
on my to-read list.
The Company: A Short History of a Revolutionary Idea
by John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge.
This book is a "history" of the modern
limited-liability, joint stock companies, and it's
interesting on several levels.
First, it's a history about one of the most influential ideas of modern
times, that nevertheless doesn't normally get examined as its own history
(companies are legally a fictional person... so why not treat their
history the same way?).
Indeed, the book claims that "the most important organization in the
world is the company [not the state, commune, or political party]."
Though business has been going on for a long time, the full-fledged
limited-liability joint stock company only dates from the mid-1800s... and
it's completely taken over.
Second, it turns out that many of the issues discussed today about
modern multinationals aren't new... they've been raised for a long time.
President Rutherford B. Hayes: "This is a government of the people,
by the people, and for the people no longer... it is a government of
corporations, by corporations and for corporations."
Edward I in 1279 issued the Statute of Mortmain, to stem the
flow of assets to the "dead hand" of corporate bodies.
The conflict between owners and the company managers (agents), known as
the "agency problem", has been discussed and never fully solved right
from their beginning.
Yet the authors do a good job arguing that companies have actually
become (on average) more ethical, more humane, more socially responsible
than in the past; they also argue that the concept of the company
has been one of the West's great competitive advantages.
Indeed, they strongly make the point (page 186) that
"the modern company still needs a franchise from society, and the
terms of that franchise still matter enormously.
From the company's point of view, two clouds have gathered...
corporate scandals and... social responsibility."
Companies now often do good works, in part because they fear what will
happen if they do not.
And perhaps the best thing about companies is that they have developed
ways to create products and services that are far more affordable than they
were before, giving wealth to us all.
Ronald Coase's 1937 article "The Nature of the Firm" argues that
the main reason why a company exists is because it minimizes the
transaction costs of coordinating a particular economic activity;
bring all the people in-house, and you reduce the costs of
"negotiating and concluding a separate contract for each exchange transaction."
But these gains must be balanced against "hierarchy costs" -
the costs of central managers ignoring dispersed information.
This is interesting to consider when examining open source software projects,
which also enable coordination of economic activity, and tend to use
wide-open mailing lists to counter hierarchy costs.
(movie).
Okay, the sequels weren't so great, but
the first one was wonderful. Loved it.
This is not okay for kids; it's rated R for a reason.
See my essay
Man as the World-Builder; or for a lighter note, see
How to Throw a Matrix Party. !!!!!
This is an alternate history series in which the inhabitants of a
small town in West Virginia ("Grantville")
are transported back to Central Germany, May 1631, with no way back.
This thing is a riot - it's a lot of fun.
Basically, the people of Grantville decide to start the American Revolution
150 years early, and it's a fun intellectual exercise to figure out what
modern technology works in this setting... and what doesn't.
This is actually the beginning of a huge number of books and stories, written
by many people, which are both fact and fiction:
1633
,
1634: The Ram Rebellion (Assiti Shards)
,
1634: The Bavarian Crisis (The Ring of Fire)
,
1634: The Galileo Affair (The Ring of Fire)
,
1634: The Baltic War
,
The Grantville Gazette
,
Grantville Gazette II
,
and
Grantville Gazette III
.
Note that 1632 is not for kids; there's more than a little gore,
language, and a honeymoon-night scene.
At the least, 1632 and 1633 are especially good.
There's a big fan website where people discuss the fictional world,
1632.org, where there are lots of interesting
essays and stuff like
dead horses,
Sarah Wendell's "The Ring of Fire and the Money Supply" and
Voice of Europe/America's
interval signal.
!!!!!
by David J. Agans.
Good book;
by Brian Chess and Jacob West discusses static analysis tools
in great detail.
I just got the book, so can't really post a review yet; I'll post more
once I've had a chance to really consider it.
by Neil Howe and William Strauss.
This book posits a simple theory
that each human generation belongs to one of four types,
and that these types repeat sequentially in a fixed pattern.
It then examines U.S. history to see if this theory models U.S. history well,
and the book is an extraordinary good case that it does model it well.
by Bernard Lewis.
A fascinating (and saddening) examination of the Islamic world.
He describes an ossified culture, often unable to deal with modernity,
and where violent men advocate even more retreat from modernity
in the perverse belief that it would help.
Every trivial issue seems to be controlled by jurists' rulings, and
constantly prevents them from taking up even many small improvements.
(For centuries they couldn't even stay in the West to learn from them,
and even now rulings seem to forbid critical improvements and freedoms.)
According to Lewis,
freedom of thought is quite limited; religious minorities have been
tolerated, but not in Saudi Arabia, and
though there's a verse about not compelling someone into a religion,
it's a capital punishment to leave the muslim faith (those who try, or tell
muslims about other faiths, are killed).
Political freedom is unavailable in most such countries also.
A small example is illuminating:
wheeled vehicles, commonly used in the area before Islam,
gradually went out of use in Islamic Middle Eastern countries until
they were re-introduced by the West.
"This was a symptom of a bigger problem. A cart is large and,
for a peasant, relatively costly. It is difficult to conceal and
easy to requisition. At a time and place where neither
law nor custom restricted the power of even local authorities,
visible and mobile assets were a poor investment.
The same fear of predatory authority - or neighbors - may be seen in the
structure of traditional houses and narrow alleyways, the careful
avoidance of any visible sigh of wealth...
the advent of paved roads and wheeled vehicles in
modern times brought no alleviation of the larger problems" (p. 157-158).
Indeed, the whole notion of separation of church and state is completely
absent from their thinking (with notable exceptions, such as Turkey which
is doing comparatively well).
Blaming the U.S. or Israel is common, yet they appear to be mere scapegoats;
they didn't even exist before the area's decline.
by Bernard Lewis.
More insights; really good; 'nuf said.
by Milton Viorst.
It takes a whirlwind view of history, so at time it can be a little
rough to follow, but it's very good at noticing the many failures on
all sides, and the repeated lost opportunities.
There's a particularly nice inight on page 127, discussing 1963:
"The three most powerful Arab states - Nasser's Egypt, Syria, and Iraq -
were committed to a Pan-Arab ideology. So, apparently, were the Arab masses.
Yet the unification that had once seemed inevitable never occurred...
Each of the Arab countries held firm to its own national identity.
Pan-Arabism's failure demonstrated that Arabs could pledge their bond to
the Arab community, to the umma, while at the same time
embracing the nationalism of the state in which they lived...
Arabs were at ease in the 1960s giving their loyalty to Pan-Arabism as an
ideology, without surrendering their identity as Iraqis, Syrians, or
Egyptians. Most seem to feel that way today."
Another quotable is on page 133: "Arabs had no good explanation for the
disaster of 1967 and many took the easy route of blaming... the West.
A few brave thinkers adopted the unpopular position that Arabs should
look for the blame within themselves, or at least within their culture.
But Arab society, historically resistant to change, is not by nature
introspective. Arabs were generally unwilling to upset conventional
values, so many of them rooted in history and Islam.
The catastrophe produced little in the way of useful insights."
Page 153: "[In the 1980s] Islamic nationalists from around the world
mobilized in Afghanistan [against the USSR]... though not quite
admitting the U.S. as their ally, they gladly accepted American weapons...
Thanks in large part to the United States, the Afghan coalition
emerged victorious."
Page 165, on why democracy is not working in Iraq:
"To succeed, democracy requires individuals to make their own judgements.
Sectarianism, tribalism, and regionalism are its enemies... few
Iraqis voted as individuals. Shi'ites voted as Shi'ites, Sunnis as
Sunnis, Kurds as Kurds... the elections provided no advancement toward
a stable society..."
Page 174, "The solution may well lie in the president's willingness
to turn to the Arab community for help.
The Arab states, every one of them volatile, recognize the jeopardy they
themselves face in Iraq... [they] share with America an interest
in keeping Iraq's society and territorial integrity intact."
by Jared Diamond is stupendously interesting.
He explains that many events of history - particularly the rise of the West
over societies like those in the Americas and Papua New Guinea -
are well-explained by examining the resources available to them.
He also pleas for the creation of a "science of history", in which the
scientific method is used to create theories of causation that can be tested
(he's arguing for something like "psychohistory" in Asimov's Foundation
series, though surprisingly never mentions that).
One problem with this book is that it doesn't sufficiently admit
the strong impact on history from areas other than environment,
such as human ideas/culture
(think Middle Eastern Islam vs. European Christianity),
and stupendously gifted individuals (think Alexander the Great).
Perhaps that's necessary; he's trying to find all important causes not
due to these things, and by putting on such blinders, he manages to delve deep.
In any case, it's really insightful, and worth a read.
DVDs as well. !!!!!
by Clayton M. Christensen is startlingly good.
It describes how well-run companies can be completely destroyed by
disruptive technologies, because they are well-run.
Be careful: the term "disruptive technology" doesn't mean what a
technologist might think - a technology might be radically different
and risky, but sustaining and not disruptive given Christensen's definitions.
In his terminology, a disruptive technology is one where the innovation
results in worse product performance as traditionally measured in the near
term,
but they have other features that a few fringe (and generally new)
customers want... and have the potential to grow into eventually
providing adequate product performance.
"Products based on disruptive technologies are typically cheaper,
simpler, smaller, and, frequently, more convenient to use."
Since the customers for such products are new, and typically small, the
"big guys" won't serve them... yet those who do will grow the technology
until it's sufficiently capable to upset the established players.
It doesn't have to be better under the old measures - just good
enough, and with other advantages (such as being much cheaper or flexible).
Eventually the upstarts grow the technology until it's a threat to the
"big guy" - by that point it's too late, and the "big guy" vanishes. !!!!!
by Kirk Cheyfitz.
Good overview of the fundamentals for running a business.
It's all too easy to chase after fads in business, and that's a mistake.
This is an antidote, focusing on the basics: profits, cash flow,
cutting expenses is always more certain than increasing sales,
customers are boss, hiring smart (instead of managing hard),
results are more important than process, and so on.
by Art Spiegelman.
"Maus" is really good - it even won a Pulitzer prize.
It's a non-fiction graphic novel that tells two stories:
the story of how his father survived the World War II holocaust,
and the story of the relationship between father and son.
I have the two-volume bookset, though it's now published as a single work.
It is poignant and deep.
The story of his father's survival through a combination of incredible
presence of mind and luck is gripping (and disturbing).
But the more-recent timeframe lets the author explore a lot of
the complications that are really hard to express.
Some people are fooled into thinking that this is a work of fiction,
because as an artistic convension he depicts all the people
with animal heads (mice for Jews, cats for Germans, pigs for Poles,
dogs for Americans, and so on).
He really starts to exploit and make fun of this convention as he goes,
poking fun at our stereotypes.
This is one of those "you must read this before you die" books.
by Dr. Warren Farrell.
This is definitely not politically correct, but it is full
of detailed studies and statistics that don't seem to be discussed elsewhere.
Many claim that "women earn less than men doing the same thing", but
according to the data gathered into this book, that's wrong --
instead, women tend to not do "the same thing".
Past studies only compared titles, which often turns out to be very misleading.
By digging deeper, Farrell has found that
women tend to make choices that lead to lower pay, so they tend to not
do the same thing in the first place!
When women intentionally make such trade-offs, that's great,
but often women seem to make choices without realizing that
they are choosing the lower-paying options.
He uses lots of statistics and stories to show what it takes to earn more.
Higher-paying fields tend to involve
technology (vs. arts or social sciences), hazards,
sleet and heat (vs. indoors and neat) when little education is required,
work you can't "check out" from at the end of the day,
work with lower personal fulfillment (engineer vs. child care),
higher financial/emotional risks, the worst hours, unpleasant environments,
ones that require constant updating, and specialized subfields.
To make more money, you need to work more hours than others,
have more relevant years of experience, and be absent less often.
People who relocate tend to make more.
And of course, taking on bigger responsibility, requiring less security,
and producing more all tends to result in more money coming back in.
This is not a victim's book, but really a book on "what can you do
to earn more".
He doesn't say this, but it all boils to down to supply and demand -
workers who are in high demand and short supply
(due to danger, difficulty of gaining the prerequisites, etc.)
tend to earn lots more!
Note that simply saying "the same field" isn't enough - the person willing
to relocate, or work for many more hours each week,
may have the "same" title as someone else but is
likely to be earning more money.
Frankly, all of these factors seemed obvious to me, but apparantly
these factors aren't obvious to many others.
Though there are many statistics in this book, one of the many
stories illustrates the point (p. 38): "While I was writing...
a Goodwill rep called to cancel a pickup at my home...
the driver said it was too dangerous for her to travel
with her truck down the narrow, curving streets to my home...
A year or so later I called again and Goodwill came. No problem.
But also no woman driver."
There are also some interesting comments about military service that,
if true, are very concerning if you want a
military to win instead of being politically correct (PC).
This isn't a book justifying paying women less; quite the contrary, it's
a guidebook for women so that they can be sure they fully understand
the impacts of their choices,
which in my mind is the best idea.
Money is not the be-all; in many cases it's a good idea
to forgo money for something more important to you, and it can give you peace
of mind if you understand your choices.
It's actually a pretty interesting book for men trying to make
income trade-offs, too.
It's not PC, but it's a compelling case, and certainly mind-opening.
Very interesting.
by Bevin Alexander.
The author claims that there are 13 rules which win wars
(striking at enemy weakness, feigning retreat, and so on).
He then devotes a chapter to each rule, describing the rule and various
battles that illustrate it.
He's very insightful on some of his comments, though I don't completely agree
with some of his prognostications.
His rules, though, are very sensible for explaining the past.
His rules are:
striking at enemy weakness, defend then attack, holding one place (and)
striking another, feigned retreat, the central position
(this one is really surprising), employing a superior weapon
(though too many generals have mistakenly thought they had one),
driving a stake in the enemy's heart,
blocking the enemy's retreat, landing an overwhelming blow,
stroke at a weak spot, caldron battles,
uproar east (then) attack west, and manuevers on the rear.
He includes not just successes, but failures to apply these principles.
For example, he notes that Germany in World War II needed oil, and
if they took the Soviet's oil fields (in the Caucasus and along the shores
of the Caspian sea) it would cripple the Soviet Union while strengthening
Germany. Yet Hitler required his soldiers to do both that and
seize Stalingrad - hundreds of miles away, and completely unnecessary if
his goal (as stated) was to stop the flow of oil (capturing the Caucasus
would have done that too!).
By dividing his strength, he failed to do either.
Of course, much of this is not new (Sun Tzu said in the 5th century
"make an uproar in the east, but attack in the west"), but it's an
interesting summary.
(movie).
One of the best comedies of all time.
Actually, the best comedy of all time.
Not for kids.
If you haven't seen it, go buy it. Now. !!!!!